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In their book on Descartes’s changing mind, Peter Machamer and J.E. McGuire argue that 
Descartes discarded dualism to embrace a kind of monism. It is intriguing to investigate if the 
master of dualism could have changed his mind about the central aspect of his system. After 
reviewing the position of the authors, we will consider how and in what terms Descartes did 
not go back on his favorite doctrine but may have fooled himself about the nature of his dualism. 
It is my contention that the so-called problematic Cartesian dualism has its origin in the lack 
of proper definition of mind and body as substances and the role of their respective attributes, 
thought and extension in the definition of the substances. The main answer to Machamer and 
McGuire’s thesis is that Descartes could develop his epistemology of mind and body 
independently of a metaphysics of substance and its attributes. In other words not only did 
Descartes not change his mind, but he persevered and enriched his dualist metaphysics. The 
subsidiary answer to the authors is that the concessions given by Descartes to the opponents of 
his dualism can be found in earlier works, but, pace the authors, they did not cause him not to 
develop his dualism in the first place.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The last sentence of the authors of Descartes’s changing mind is the following: 
“Perhaps, at the end of his life, Descartes was not much a dualist after all.” 
(Machamer and McGuire 2009: 241). 
The statement suggests that Descartes in his final works gave up his dualism between the strict 
separation between mind and body, and embraced a monist position. According to Machamer 
and McGuire, for the late Descartes mind and body have certain attributes in common and can 
no longer be considered as independent substances. They claim that although such an idea is 
out of context in the works of the young Descartes, he developed it gradually in his later 
writings.  
The question of whether Descartes changed his mind on the nature of these substances 
and their union is of prime importance. This problem is a sensitive one because most of 
Descartes’s opponents, such as Gassendi, Leibniz, or Henry More, emphasized that Descartes’s 
conception was incoherent, a failure, or at least incomplete. Nevertheless, contemporary 
commentators such as Lili Allanen, Ted Richardson or Tad Schmaltz have tried to make sense 
of it. After reading Descartes’s changing mind, it seems to me that a new attempt to save the 
coherence of the mind/body union emerges, a union without dualism and an epistemology free 
of the metaphysics of substance.  
In his late correspondence with Henry More, Descartes amended his theory that mind and 
body were incommensurable substances. Is this enough to consider that Descartes had really 
abandoned his dualism? How do the authors reason to reach this position? They invite us to 
revisit the Cartesian mind-body union problem and describe a developmental process of 
knowledge at work in Descartes’s philosophy. To back up their enterprise, Machamer and 
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McGuire quote the following remarkable passage of a reply from Descartes to Henry More of 
February 5, 1649: 
“True, our mind is not the measure of reality or truth; but certainly it should be the 
measure of what we affirm or deny. What is more rash or absurd than to want to 
make judgments about matters which we admit our mind cannot perceive?” (Letter 
to More, February 5, 1649). (Machamer and McGuire 2009: 241). 
Descartes acknowledges here a discrepancy between the nature of reality and what of it the 
mind can reach. While reality or truth is not entirely perceived by the mind, it still may be 
possible for us to glimpse it momentarily. This statement seems to be very much in retreat of 
the conclusions we could have drawn from the reading of the Meditations or the Discourse on 
the Method. Descartes’s acceptance of our limited knowledge leads the authors to believe that 
Descartes changed his mind about his dualism in his later correspondence, the Passions of the 
Soul and Principles of Philosophy.  
In order to answer this claim, we will revisit the Cartesian process of knowledge 
according to Machamer and McGuire‘s book. We shall argue that Descartes did not really 
change his mind, even if he was not married to a strict dualism (finding evidence for this in the 
correspondence) nor truly based his dualism on solid foundation of theory of substance. We 
shall investigate this last point and envision how the problem of the mind/body union is directly 
related to the conception of substance and its attributes. Finally, after reviewing Descartes’s 
early correspondence with Gassendi, and late correspondence with Henry More, we will 
consider that, although Descartes may have been sensitive to some of their objections, he did 
not reconsider his dualist position.  
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2. HOW, ACCORDING TO MACHAMER AND McGUIRE, DESCARTES BECAME 
A KIND OF MONIST 
Whereas many philosophers have recognized the inconsistencies of Cartesian dualism, 
Peter Machamer and J.E. McGuire describe an epistemological teleology capable of resolving 
these metaphysical discrepancies.  Tracing the development of Descartes’s views on mind and 
body, they reached the conclusion that Descartes became gradually less sure he could fully 
understand the nature of substances. They find that Descartes had come to realize the limitations 
of the human mind and therefore the impossibility of justifying its absolute distinction from the 
body. 
A. Machamer and McGuire emphasize that for Descartes, human knowledge is limited and 
that only God has absolute knowledge. 
Machamer and McGuire announce in their first chapter: “We will argue that Descartes’s 
dualism has to be understood in terms of what we call his epistemic teleology” (Machamer and 
McGuire 2009: 4) They articulate their reasoning in the framework of a developmental 
epistemology according to which Descartes would have, in the first part of the Principles and 
then in the Passions of the Soul, given up his dualism because of the impossibility of knowing 
the nature of substances.  According to Descartes, our mind presents us with two separate 
substances, mind and body with distinct attributes of thought and extension (Principles of 
Philosophy). According to Machamer and McGuire, because of the limitation of our intellect, 
we cannot have insight about the nature of spiritual substance or material substance. Descartes 
gave up his desire for absolute knowledge and instead organized his epistemology according to 
the limits of our mind.  For instance, the authors interpret principle 62, first part of the Principles 
in these terms: “Descartes now emphasizes what we may know, namely, the attributes of 
extension and thought, rather than substance itself.” (Machamer and McGuire 2009: 227). Here 
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begins for them the epistemological stance taken by Descartes to underline that only the 
attributes are knowable. Their interpretation does not hold in regards to what Descartes wrote 
about thought and extension in the following Principle 64, I:  
“Because when we regard them (thought and extension) as in the substances of 
which they are modes, we distinguish them from these substances and take them for 
what they actually are; while, on the contrary, if we wish to consider them apart 
from the substances in which they are, that will have the effect of our taking them 
as self-subsisting things and thus confounding the ideas of mode and substance.” 
(Descartes 2000: 249).  
 Descartes insists here that we would confuse attributes and substance if we separate 
attributes from their respective substances. The authors emphasize that Descartes turned his 
back progressively on ontology and adopted a more pragmatic attitude towards knowledge that 
they call “epistemic teleology shift.” They write:  
“The epistemic consequence of this, as we hope to show, is that the world may 
contain many things that we neither know nor have the possibility of knowing. More 
specifically it means, for example, that we cannot know, or minimally we cannot 
know that we know, the real nature of substances, but only some of their useful 
attributes or particular modes that, yet, are, still mind-independent.” (Machamer 
and McGuire 2009: 2). 
In principle 3 of Part II, Descartes contradicts this statement:  
“Sensory perceptions do not teach us what is really in things, but merely what is 
useful or harmful to man’s composite nature.” (Descartes 2000: 254) 
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Machamer and McGuire argue from Descartes recognition of the limits of human 
knowledge as regards the divine to the limitation of human knowledge about the nature of 
substances; they write:  
“Descartes came to see more clearly that just as God’s transcendent nature is 
beyond our comprehension, so likewise, there is much in created reality that 
surpasses our cognitive grasp since it lies beyond the limitations of the finite 
intellect.” (Machamer and McGuire 2009: 197). 
For Machamer and McGuire, if it is true that God is the warrant of our knowledge and that mind 
alone defines of material substance as geometric extension (Principles of Philosophy, II), it is 
sensation with mind that shapes the interaction between mind and body. They emphasize that 
sensation is rooted in our body and our best ally to ease our life while the mind alone is not able 
to guide us. Nevertheless, we cannot deny that how clearly this inter-substance relation can be 
expressed depends on the mind.  By his own criteria, Descartes would have to provide a clear 
and distinct idea of how this interaction takes place. The Cartesian epistemological shift, as 
described by the authors, tends to identify the nature of the mind with the one of the body and 
this should become more obvious in Descartes’s mature period. 
B. For Machamer and McGuire, union between mind and body concerns us as persons and 
excludes metaphysics. 
The idea of a person is linked to the idea of a soul and a body.  The authors point out that, 
at the time of his later works, The Passions of the Soul and the Principles, Descartes relies on 
sensation to reveal the union between mind and body. They write in Descartes’s changing 
mind: 
“In his treatment of mind-body distinction as a substantial union constitutive of the 
nature of person, he begins to downplay any need for maintaining a strict and direct 
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ontological distinction between mind and body…. But notice that is sensations that 
reveal immediately that the union is real and substantial.” (Machamer and 
McGuire 2009: 233- 234). 
The authors recall that the union of mind and body takes place in a person and may want to say 
that there are different laws in the metaphysical and physical relationship between matter and 
mind. To clarify how the union between mind and body should be viewed, the authors argue 
from the Passions of the Soul that we should consider the person instead of the body and the 
mind and write: 
“But if the principal attributes of soul and body (thinking and extension) can be 
both active and passive, and if we know a substance only through its principal 
attributes, or are able to distinguish soul and body solely by means of their principle 
attribute, it seems on this basis alone that we will be unable to make and infer a 
real mind/body distinction.”(Machamer and McGuire 2009: 239). 
Thus mind is identified with the soul, which happens in the process of relying on our own 
experience. In everyday life, we may experience something of soul/body union, and therefore 
acquire a kind of knowledge. For the authors, the Passions of the Soul give us a clue to the 
indescribable union that seemingly displaces both substances. 
C. According to Machamer and McGuire, mind and body do not need to exist as substances 
The authors show how the epistemology in the Principles of Part II concerns our limited 
and viable knowledge rather than metaphysics. As Descartes identifies spiritual substance with 
thinking, and material substance with extension, the authors contend that Descartes no longer 
requires any substance in relation to mind and body. According to the authors, the fact that 
Descartes admits that we cannot know the totality of the world created by God proves our 
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human limitation and the impossibility of knowing what substances are in themselves. In 
chapter six, the authors draw a conclusion on the attributes of Cartesian substances: 
“So there is no direct warrant for a real distinction, since these substances are not 
known by us directly but only through their principal attributes.” (Machamer and 
McGuire 2009: 229). 
Regarding the separation of the substances, our mind presents us with distinct attributes 
of mind and body, that is to say thought and extension, but does not give us access to their 
intrinsic substances. They explain that we cannot have insight into the nature of spiritual 
substance or material substance because of the limited human intellect.  
Therefore, I would argue that this thesis in Descartes’s changing mind is not defensible 
because it negates the fundamental role of thinking and corporeal substance. In their attempt to 
suppress the Cartesian theory of substance, the authors oppose the philosophers who locate the 
secret of the union within the substance: 
“In our view, the dispute between the dualists, the interactionists, and the trialists 
is misconceived because all parties treat the concepts of mind and body as requiring 
direct ontological reference. They also assume that Descartes is concerned from 
first to last with upholding, always in the same way, a real distinction between mind 
and body.” (Machamer and McGuire 2009: 232). 
From here, it is clear that the authors oppose the dualists and trialists, and consider that the 
notion of substance has no role to play in Descartes’s epistemology at the stage of the Principles, 
and is not needed to understand the union between mind and body. However, Descartes devotes 
most of the first part of his Principles to defining substance, namely the material in opposition 
to the spiritual substances, and these definitions are the building blocks of his philosophy. For 
Machamer and McGuire Descartes is already skeptical about these definitions in the first part 
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of this Principles. We shall consider in the next section how the definition of substance supports 
the concepts of mind and body union.   
 
3. CARTESIAN DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE AND WHY SUBSTANCE CANNOT 
BE IGNORED 
A. Substance and dualism 
The concept of substance is the ontological bedrock of the Cartesian system.  As in most 
rationalist systems, substance justifies other conceptual distinctions and must therefore be 
understood with the utmost clarity. For Descartes, the definition of substance is what ultimately 
articulates his theory of the idea of God, matter, body, mind and person.  That is to say that the 
Cartesian dualism is embedded in the notion of substance, and that if mind-substance and body-
substance is discarded, so is his dualism. Marleen Rozemond, in her book Descartes’s dualism, 
develops the same idea but not for the same reason; she writes: 
“It is certainly true that Descartes was concerned with the possibility of mind 
existing without body, but I will argue that this idea is not central to his argument. 
His dualism does not consist in this possibility, nor is it fundamental to the 
argument. Instead, crucial argument is Descartes’s conception of substance, 
including important claims about the relationship between the nature or essence of 
a substance and the properties it can have.” (Rozemond 2002: 1). 
Rozemond and I agree that substance and its attributes is at the center of the Cartesian 
dualism. While Rozemond is sure that Descartes develops with full clarity his conception of the 
two separate substances in order to make work his mechanism, it seems to me that Descartes’s 
dualism articulates with difficulties the relation of the spiritual substance identified with the 
mind to the material substance, identified with the body. A sign of this difficult articulation is 
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the multiplication of interpretations concerning the number of substances involved. For 
instance, the trialists would argue that the mind/body in a person forms a third substance. In his 
attack against trialists, Dan Kaufman emphasizes that thought and extension are attributes of a 
different kind: 
“The fact that human beings have only the two principal attributes of thought and 
extension, in conjunction with the fact that all modes are modes of a principal 
attribute, shows that human beings must be only modes of thought and of 
extension.” (Kaufman 2008: 71). 
This standpoint respects the Cartesian hierarchical ontology between substance, attribute 
and mode (way of being of attributes), and corroborates the dualist nature of the Cartesian 
substances mind and body. Machamer and McGuire do not acknowledge dualism, trialism or 
even monism because the notion of substance has for them no function in the Cartesian 
mind/body union. Instead of metaphysics of substance, the authors dwell on perceptual 
experience to understand the mind/body relation and write: “The system is comprised of two 
dependent created substances, mind and body, that are related in the closest way possible, by a 
shared identity of representative content brought about intentionality.” (Machamer and 
McGuire 2009: 220). For them, these two dependent created substances, that is to say mind and 
body, do not even differ anymore from each other We can see how Machamer and McGuire 
progressively ruined all the basis of the Cartesian dualism.  
 If Descartes had to be a monist, then mind and body should be two aspects of the same 
substance. So in order to form an opinion about Descartes’s dualism or monism, we need to 
analyze the role of substance in the mind and body. The authors have considered that for 
Descartes substance does not play a role, explaining that progressively Descartes gave up any 
pretention to reach metaphysical conclusions. They mean that Descartes, aware of his cognitive 
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limits, would have preferred to abandon his dualism of substances; the authors explain: “Our 
point is that for epistemic purposes we are able to conceive substances only under their principal 
attributes or under their respective modes.” (Machamer and McGuire 2009: 231). It seems to 
me, on the contrary, that for metaphysical and epistemic reasons, Descartes needs the concept 
of substance and that the principal attributes cannot replace the substances mind and body. In 
his article about Descartes’s dualism, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2008) considers somewhat 
like Machamer and McGuire that thought and extension can replace substances; not because 
our knowledge of substance is limited as Machamer and McGuire claim, but because there 
would be only a conceptual and not a real difference between the nature of substance and its 
main attributes. That’s why we need to investigate Descartes account of substance and its main 
attributes. In the first Part of the Principles, Descartes mentions three distinct substances: God, 
mind and matter and relates as such the two last substances to their attributes in P I, 64:  
“We then distinguish them (thought and extension) modally from substance, and 
they may be understood not less clearly and distinctly, provided that we do not think 
of them as substances or things separate from others, but simply as modes of 
things.” (Descartes, 2000: 249).  
So Descartes underlines that modes should not be confused with the substances; this means that 
thought and extension should not be confused with mind and body as modes are just ways to 
be for the two substances. For instance, the modes of the corporeal substance are extension, 
shape, size.   
B. The relationship between substances and their attributes 
Substances and attributes have a special interaction within Cartesian dualism because on 
the one hand substances are stated to be independent from their attributes, and on the other hand 
they depend on their attributes to be detected by us as existence. The main thesis of the Cartesian 
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substance is the following: the first substance is divine, infinite and creates the other substances, 
spiritual and material substances. Each of these two substances has the following 
characteristics: they are created by God and persist by themselves in time, they have attributes 
that are proof of their own existence, and finally, they are subjects. In P I, 52 Descartes writes:  
“Created substances, however, whether corporeal or thinking, may be understood 
under this common concept: for they are things that need only the concurrence of 
God in order to exist. But yet substance cannot be first discovered merely from the 
fact that it is an existing thing, for that fact alone is not observed by us.” (Descartes, 
2000: 244.) 
Body and mind as substances need the concurrence of God to exist and their respective 
attributes depend on the existence of the substances body and soul. The other thesis is that 
substances need attributes to be known distinctly. Previously, in the appendix following his 
Responses to the Fifth Objections made by Gassendi, Descartes had mentioned, also, that 
substance is perceived through its attributes in the following terms: 
 ‘In distinguishing a substance from its accidents, we must consider both one and 
the other, and this helps greatly in coming to know it; whereas if instead we only 
separate by abstraction this substance from its accidents, that is, if we consider it 
quite alone without thinking of them, that prevents us from knowing it well, because 
it is by its accidents that the nature of substance is manifested.” (Descartes, 
Cottingham et al. 1984a: 277)  
Also, in the first part of his Principles, Pl, 52, Descartes completes his definition of 
substance by admitting it is discovered through its attributes and quotes: 
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“We may, however, easily discover it (substance) by means of any one of its 
attributes, because it is a common notion that nothing is possessed of no attributes, 
properties, or qualities.” (Descartes 2000: 244). 
Descartes admits here that the existence of substance is only detectable by its perceived 
attributes, as we do not have direct access to substance itself. Its attributes are, in fact, for 
us the manifestation of the existence of substance. Clear and distinct perception of 
attributes are representations of substance. This point is crucial for understanding the 
nature of Cartesian dualism, and consequently the power of the mind to discover that 
thought and extension reveal the existence of the spiritual and material substance. But as 
shown before, the attributes cannot exist alone, and at no time can be dissociated from 
substance as Machamer and McGuire believe.  
The question is then to understand the role of attributes in the definition of 
substance.  First, it could be the source of confusion regarding the actual role or nature of 
substance in the Cartesian system.  Second, as advocated by Machamer and McGuire, it 
could indicate Descartes’s limitations in formulating an idea of metaphysical substance.  
Third, it could refer to the need to distinguish common experience of mind and body 
through their attributes from their metaphysical knowledge as spiritual and material 
substances. As Descartes never wrote that substance cannot be grasped totally, and even 
if he did not clarify if substance could be of different kind in the mind, body or union, his 
dualism cannot be discarded. As defined in the Principles of Philosophy, mind and body 
are two independent substances, but at the same time need to be perceived by extension 
and thought in order to be discovered as substances. The attributes function as the means 
of perception of an otherwise imperceptible entity, even in the case of the body. The 
Cartesian framework should then disclose the reason for inferring the existence of these 
two separate substances based on the perception of their attributes. In order to look into 
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this question we shall examine the definitions given by Descartes of mind and body as 
substances. One special character shared by the substances mind and body is to be subject 
of their attributes. In definition 7 following the Reply to the Second Set of Objections, 
Descartes emphasizes that substances do not much weight to the subject in relation to the 
individualization of the corporeal substance, and writes:  
 “That substance which is the immediate subject of local extension and of the 
accidents that presuppose extension, such as shape, position, movement from place, 
and so on, is called body.” (Descartes 2000: 162). 
For Rozemond (2002), the fact that substances are subjects is the proof they cannot be 
considered as the same entities.  However what Descartes means with the “body” as ‘immediate 
subject of extension’ is not so clear. According to this definition, the role of corporeal substance 
is to be a subject of the main attribute extension. The subject seems then to be limited to support 
extension and does not have any other function in the corporeal substance itself.  
We conclude from this set of definitions that mind and body are not defined as substances 
as univocally as they could, and in consequence come short as independent subjects. The two 
substances mind and body exist for us because we can know something about their attributes. 
We are forced to concede that the nature of the substances relying on their attributes does puzzle 
our understanding of substance itself as much as Descartes may have been puzzled (Monnoyeur 
1992). However, it seems difficult, as Machamer and McGuire do, to abandon dualism of 
substances even when these substances are discovered only through their respective attributes 
(thought for the mind and extension for the body). Substance and attributes are mutually 
dependent, and definition of mind and body is possible thanks to their respective main attribute 
thought and extension. Nevertheless, in no way these attributes can replace their substance and 
exist by themselves as Machamer and McGuire support it. Although Gonzalo Rodriguez-
Final Version accepted to be published in Journal of Philosophical Research Vol 41 · January 2017 
 15
Pereyra considers like Machamer and McGuire that substance and main attributes are not 
distinct entities, he states that there is a dualism of properties at work. It seems to me that there 
is no identification between spiritual substance and thought on the one side, and corporeal 
substance and extension on the other side. In doing so, Descartes may perplex his readers and 
writes in Principle I, 53 of the first part of the Principles, AT IX-2, Volume 48 GF p 123:  
“Namely, extension in length, width and depth constitutes the nature of corporal 
substance.” (Descartes, 2000: 244). 
and just after admitting in principle 9, Principles of Philosophy II,  
 “Corporeal substance, when distinguished from its quantity, is confusedly 
conceived as something incorporeal…” (Descartes 2000: 256). 
Does Descartes mean here that corporeal substance could be incorporeal in its nature if it is 
conceived only as subject, and not as extension? As we can only conceive clearly extension, 
Descartes defines the nature of corporeal substance as extension, because as subject it would 
be confused. At this stage, we are very far from Stephen Gaukroger’s statement about the nature 
of substance in Descartes’s system of Natural Philosophy: 
“The first is that mind and body are separate substances with completely different 
sets of properties. One thing this means is that there is no grey area between the 
two, there are no blurred boundaries.” (Gaukroger 2002: 92). 
 My thesis is that there are two major conclusions about the relation of substance and its 
attributes; the first one is that extension and thought make us discover the existence of 
substance; the second one, is that although Descartes distinguishes the substance of mind from 
thought, and substance of the body from extension, his nature of his dualism is borne by the 
main attributes. Nevertheless, this does not mean that mind and body are the same substances, 
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in other words supported by a monist theory of substance. This double line of interpretation is 
interesting because it shows that Descartes wants to keep the metaphysics of substance 
separated from the perception of substance by its attributes, and that the dualism relies mainly 
on the attributes. Blake Dutton held that the conceptual weakness of the Cartesian dualism 
comes from the absence of a justified connection between attributes and substances:   
“From this independent conceivability he infers that they can exist apart from one 
another, and hence, are really distinct. But this way of proceeding is only viable if 
Descartes can justify the pairing of thinking with non-extended and extended with 
non-thinking. Otherwise, he has no assurance that in conceiving of mind and body 
he is conceiving of diverse substances rather than one and the same substance 
conceived through diverse attributes.” (Dutton 2003: 395) 
  According to Dutton the attributes of thought and extension, as referred also to indivisibility 
and divisibility, are not enough to differentiate the substances of mind and body, jeopardizing 
the dualism. Nevertheless, Descartes defends his dualism on a strict differentiation mind and 
body as substances, and writes in Principle 60, 1:  
“Similarly, because each one of us understands that he thinks, and that in thinking 
he can shut off from himself every other substance, either thinking or extended, we 
may conclude that each of us, similarly regarded, is really distinct from every other 
thinking substance and from every corporeal substance.” (Descartes 2000: 247). 
In other words, the separation of mind and body is for Descartes rooted in our power of thinking 
that cannot be alienated. The Cartesian dualism relies on the attributes rather than on the theory 
of substance but remains a substance dualism.  
C. Leibniz and the Cartesian dualism 
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According to Leibniz, the metaphysical weakness of the Cartesian mind/body union has 
its origin in the lack of acknowledgement by Descartes of the mutual dependence between 
substance and its attributes. In his Opuscules Philosophiques Choisis, Leibniz claims: 
 “Also he falsely involved the bodily substance in extension, and misunderstood the 
union of soul and body, all because he misunderstood the nature of the substance 
in general.” (Leibniz 1996: 80)1 
Leibniz, in his comment of article 51, I, acknowledges that because substance and attributes 
need each other, it is necessary to draw a clearer distinction between substance and its attributes. 
He writes:  
“Since substance and accident require each other, it must be established other 
criteria in order to distinguish the substance of the accident.” (Leibniz 1996: 32)2  
Consequently, in his comment on article 52, I, Leibniz questions the choice of extension as 
main attribute of corporeal substance and writes:  
“It is however certain that neither movement nor action, nor resistance or passive 
force derive from extension.” (Leibniz, 1996: 33)3 
In writing so, Leibniz reproaches Descartes for his passive and weak metaphysical and 
epistemological conception of corporeal substance, and considers that the attribute extension 
cannot explain what occurs in bodies. For Leibniz, the Cartesian theory of the substances in 
relation to their attributes cannot explain the mind/body union. The passivity embedded in the 
notion of extension may explain difficulties encountered in the union between mind and body 
since we do not know where internal movement comes from. Leibniz does not think extension 
is a “primitive” notion because it does not express the action of extension of material substance. 
As in Descartes’s philosophy, motion is not an attribute but a mode of matter, and could not be 
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interchangeable with substance while extension is. Regarding movement, Descartes writes to 
Mersenne on April 26, 1643: 
“Motion, and all other modifications of substance which are called qualities, have 
not greater reality, on my view, than is commonly attributed by philosophers to 
shape, which they call only a mode and not a real quality…” (Cottingham et al. 
1991: 216)  
Leibniz, however, emphasizes that choosing motion or antitupia as the main attribute of 
the body is better than extension as a way of understanding the union between mind and bodies. 
In fact, motion would be a better attribute than extension to explain the internal movement and 
individuation of corporeal substances. Extension individualizes bodies by size, but does not 
account for form or internal movement. Because Leibniz does not rely on a dualism of 
substances but rather on a monist conception of substance, he needs to define more specifically 
and efficiently the attribute of the body. 
 The Cartesian definition of mind and body is embedded in the spiritual and material 
substance and therefore underlines the separation between the science of the bodies and the 
metaphysics of substances. This separation takes place very early in the Cartesian system and 
claims to be based on clear and distinct foundations. Descartes’s epistemology and metaphysics 
require that substances be known as spiritual and material, but the limits of perception preclude 
this ontological thesis. We will consider how and why this scission develops from very early 
on in the Cartesian system.   
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4. A NEW CONTEXT TO REFRAME CARTESIAN DUALISM 
Our previous analysis invites us to revisit the Cartesian dualism in the light of the role of 
the attributes in the substances, and the respective limits of science and metaphysics towards 
everyday experience. For instance, a different way to conceive dualism and the role of the 
senses in cognition appears in Descartes’s early correspondence with Gassendi, and late 
correspondence with Princess Elisabeth, and Henry More. 
A. Common sense knowledge of mind and body 
When battling with his correspondents on the relationship between mind and body, 
Descartes was called to reflect on the foundation for his dualism of substances. Here we find a 
softened dualism as Descartes recognizes the conflation of attributes in his definition of 
substance. Two of his main correspondents, Gassendi and Henry More, debate him on this 
question; through close reading of Descartes’s writings, we can detect whether a change 
occurred regarding the respective attributes of the two substances. 
In his work entitled The Metaphysical Meditations, Descartes sets out in Meditations II 
and VI the irreducible distinction between the two substances, the body whose nature is 
extension, and the mind whose nature is thought. Gassendi in his objections about Meditation 
II, disputes the Cartesian dualism between mind and body, quote: 
“You will have to prove that this solid body of yours contributes nothing whatever 
to your thought (for you have never been without it, and have so far never had any 
thoughts when separated from it). You will thus have to prove that you think 
independently of the body in such a way that you can never be hampered by it or 
disturbed by the foul and dense vapors or fumes which from time to time have such 
a bad effect on the brain.” (Cottingham et al. 1984b: 183).  
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In this passage, Gassendi states that body should influence the mind, namely extension or 
mobility. In his answers to Gassendi’s objections, Descartes refines his position and emphasizes 
that his knowledge of the mind and body is scientific, and not rooted in the everyday experience 
of the senses. Descartes defends his distinction of the nature of the mind and body in drawing 
a separation between knowledge for everyday life where senses are required to keep safe, and 
the search for truth that requires to be founded on certitude. He writes: 
“However we must note the distinction which I have insisted on in several passages, 
between the actions of life and the investigation of the truth…But when our inquiry 
concerns what can be known with complete certainty by the human intellect, it is 
quite unreasonable to refuse to reject these things in all seriousness as doubtful and 
even as false.” (Cottingham et al. 1984a: 243).  
Here Descartes categorizes knowledge in an unusual way; the one that belongs to everyday life, 
and the one that belongs to philosophical and scientific knowledge. This new definition of 
knowledge is contrary to the Discourse on the Method where he had previously denied that 
common sense experience could be of any use in the attainment of knowledge. This shows that 
Descartes momentarily considered the separation of mind and body to be only valid within his 
theory of knowledge but not in reality. The two substances, identified as thinking mind and 
extended body, would then be a scientific and philosophical construction, but would not 
concern the realm of everyday life. In his correspondence with Gassendi, Descartes stresses that 
the relationship of soul and body may be an issue for some philosophers, but not for any person 
full of common sense. In fact, he reproaches Gassendi for being un-methodical, and for relying 
strictly upon everyday life experiences. Is he here simply recalling what he already developed 
at length in the Discourse and his Meditations, that is that everyday experience is useless in 
science, or is he setting limits to his own theory of knowledge? As a matter of fact, Descartes 
admits to Gassendi that there is knowledge acquired from everyday life, and Gassendi succeeds 
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in pushing him to define the limits of his own system. In distinguishing the two types of 
knowledge in this conversation, whether scientific or common, Descartes gives up his idea of 
a method to reach certain knowledge applicable to both his mechanistic science/philosophy and 
everyday life experience.  
Later, in his correspondence with Elisabeth, Descartes again adopts the same line of 
reasoning as with Gassendi, when he points out that our everyday life experience is appropriate 
for the understanding of the soul/body union. At the time of his debate with Gassendi, he had 
acknowledged that there is a kind of knowledge which comes from everyday experience but 
which is not philosophical or scientific knowledge. In his letter to Elisabeth of June 28th 1643, 
Descartes emphasizes that the understanding of this union between mind and body is rooted in 
the experience of everyday life: 
 “…and finally what belongs to the union of the soul and the body is known only 
obscurely by the intellect alone or even by the intellect aided by the imagination, 
but it is known very clearly by the senses… . But it is the ordinary course of life and 
conversation, and abstention from meditation and from the study of the things which 
exercise the imagination, that teaches us how to conceive the union of the soul and 
the body.” (Cottingham et al. 1991: 227)  
Descartes states clearly that knowledge of this union comes from the senses.  
To corroborate this analysis, there is a letter of Descartes to Chanut regarding the state of 
soul/body relation before birth. In a letter of February 1st 1647, Descartes seems to reveal the 
existence of an existential relationship between mind and body. He reflects on the origin of the 
soul/body union as follows: 
“But there is no doubt that the bodily conditions that were the first to accompany 
our thoughts when we came into the world must have become more closely 
Final Version accepted to be published in Journal of Philosophical Research Vol 41 · January 2017 
 22
connected with them than those which accompany them later…I think that the soul’s 
first passion was joy, because it is not credible that the soul was put into the body 
at a time when the body was not in a good condition.. The soul, uniting itself 
willingly to that new matter, felt love for it; and later, if the food happened to be 
lacking, it felt sadness.” (Cottingham et al. 1991: 309)  
For Descartes, soul and body were united at the origin of life and the body was nourishing the 
soul. The independence of the soul begins when, after birth, we are able to abstract and the soul 
becomes mind. Originally soul and body are like one and the soul later on always remembers 
the first impressions coming from the body. The heterogeneity of mind and body developed all 
through the Cartesian corpus appears to be, in these letters, only a scientific explanation able to 
make clear their respective function. Descartes admits to Gassendi and Elisabeth that senses 
play a central role for the guidance of life in which philosophical considerations about mind-
body dualism can be ignored. The structure of the Cartesian dualism plays solely a role to give 
a scientific and metaphysical explanation of the nature of mind and body. The dichotomy 
between the world of everyday life and the world of knowledge is acknowledged without 
denying the possibility to acquire metaphysical and scientific knowledge of mind and body. No 
epistemology is possible outside the framework of this dualism operating as a model for the 
scientist. 
B. Metaphysical approach of the extension of the spirits: debate with Henry More 
One of the main issues between Descartes and his friend the dualist Henry More is the 
concept of extension. According to Cartesian dualism, extension is solely applicable to bodies, 
has shape, un-penetrability, divisibility and measurability. More however conceives that God, 
angels, and the human mind also have extension, but that this extension is of another kind. In 
his letter of December 2nd, 1648, More embraces Cartesian dualism but nevertheless desires to 
amend it in order to give extension to spiritual substances:  
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“However, in order to conceal nothing, Sir, though I am madly in love with your 
system, and the whole body of your philosophy, I confess there is something you 
missed in the second part of your principles ... But these difficulties do not wear 
blow to the core of your philosophy ....” (Monnoyeur 2004). 
In his letter of February 5th 1649, Descartes explains his view at length on the nature of 
extension, and refuses to follow More, who attributes extension to any substance. In his reply 
to Descartes of March 5th 1649, Henry More insists that spiritual extension is fundamental to 
material extension.  
Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (1984) labeled this debate on extension “a dialogue between 
deaf people” in order to underline the absence of understanding between the two dualists. This 
opinion can perhaps be challenged by the fact that More praised Descartes for his dualism, and 
convinced him that they were arguing merely about words.  
The following passage proves that Descartes is receptive to More‘s argument. In his 
answer to Morus of April 15th, 1649 Descartes quotes Henry More about the existence of 
spiritual extension: “I say that there is another, equally genuine, extension” and brings the 
following comments: 
“At last we are in substantial agreement; there only remains a question of terms, 
whether this second sort of extension is to be called equally genuine. For my part, 
in God and angels and in our mind I understand there to be no extension of 
substance, but only extension of power…But to attribute to a substance an extension 
which is only an extension of power is an effect of the preconceived opinion which 
regards every substance, including God himself, as imaginable.”   (Cottingham et 
al. 1991: 372).  
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Descartes concludes the debate by naming this spiritual extension: extension of power.  Here 
we have a concession on the attribute of extension that had been so essential for the clarity of 
understanding bodily substance.  Descartes explains a few lines later that this spiritual extension 
represents the power of spiritual substance to act upon material substance and vice versa. 
Descartes adds: 
“In fact, if there was no corporeal extension, I could not conceive any space to 
which an angel or God would be coextensive.” (Cottingham et al. 1991: 372).  
We can therefore conclude that Descartes acknowledges a power of extension to immaterial 
beings, and proper to spiritual substances. In writing so, it seems that Descartes tries to make 
sense of the attribute extension not only for the spiritual substances but also for his whole 
system.  But this kind of defense against More’s objections seems to betray the earlier 
conception of spiritual substance.  Extension had been the unique property of bodily substance 
and is now applicable to spiritual substances. However, this contradiction does not mean that 
Descartes became a monism and went further than Henry More who was a dualist. This certain 
kind of extension attributed now to spiritual substances emphasizes the important role of 
attributes in the Cartesian conception of substance. 
Our analysis of the correspondence with Gassendi and More has shown how complex and 
rich the Cartesian dualism is. We have seen how, in his correspondences, Descartes is seriously 
considering the objections to his system, accepting what he earlier refused; that is to say, the 
existence of knowledge based on everyday life and the need for an extension of power for 
spiritual substances. He seems then to have departed from a theory of knowledge based on a 
strict thought/extension dualism.  
Henry More developed a new type of dualism in his Enchiridum Metaphysicum. 
Extension is a common attribute of mind and body but with specific characteristics in each of 
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the substance (Monnoyeur 2004). In spirits, extension is penetrable but impenetrable in bodies. 
We can envision how Henry More in his correspondence could have convinced Descartes to 
embrace a form of dualism closer to his dualism.  
It seems to me that Descartes did not change his mind about the nature of his system, but 
is occasionally ready to challenge his thought/extension dualism. Machamer and McGuire may 
have convinced themselves that Descartes abandoned his dualism and adopted a new 
epistemology because of lack of confidence in human mind capacity to reach the nature of 
substances. In fact, Descartes just drew a line between knowledge of everyday life and 
metaphysical knowledge. There is useful knowledge for life coming from experience but not 
included in scientific and metaphysical knowledge. Also, the same mitigating concessions 
about the extension of spiritual substances can be found in earlier works and obviously did not 
cause him not to develop his dualism in the first place. Descartes’s so called dualism is 
challenged by his theories of substances and attributes, and the way they interact among 
themselves. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Peter Machamer and J.E. McGuire made the point that according to Descartes our mind 
is too limited to reach absolute knowledge. We have denied that this was Descartes’s intention 
and shown that in his view both metaphysics of substance and everyday experience inform us 
about the way to understand the world, in particular the mind/body union. This type of 
knowledge depends upon the senses and the mind rather than the mind alone. For instance our 
acknowledgment of the union between soul and body stems from sensitive knowledge. The 
authors consider that Descartes ‘loses philosophical ground’ when it comes to discover the 
essence of substances and re-orients his theory of knowledge towards a more pragmatic 
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purpose. In my view, Descartes does not modify his system of knowledge or belief according 
to which he can reach truth in sciences and build his metaphysics; rather he admits early to 
Gassendi that common knowledge concurs with rational knowledge in everyday life. He later 
accepts in his correspondence with Henry More that spirits have something to do with the 
extension of bodies. But these two points do not contradict his dualism based on the separation 
of the substances mind and body, and underline the role of the main attributes in his substance 
dualism. At no time, Descartes re-evaluates the validity of his dualism and his theory of 
substance that is the bedrock of his philosophy; he merely concedes to his objectors, Gassendi 
and Henry More. He does not take these concessions as serious threats to his conception of 
substance and dualism. It is nevertheless a fact that Cartesian dualism is based on a shared role 
of substance with its attributes, and neglects, as Leibniz underlines, the role of substances as 
individual subjects. As mind and body do not identify totally with their attributes thought and 
extension, these attributes bear the burden of his dualism. Descartes’s theory of the substances 
and their union emphasizes the role of attributes in his dualism, and appreciation of this role 
puts in proper perspective his epistemic shift4. 
 
NOTES 
1 Translated from French by the Author. The original text is: “Aussi a-t-il fait faussement 
consister la substance corporelle dans l’étendue, et il a mal compris l’union de l’âme et du corps, 
tout cela faute d’avoir compris la nature de la substance en général.” (Leibniz 1996 : 80) 
2 Translated from French by the Author. The original text is: “Puisque la substance et l’accident 
s’exigent mutuellement, il faut établir d’autres critères, afin de pouvoir distinguer la substance 
de l’accident;” (Leibniz 1996: 32) 
3 Translated from French by the Author. The original text is: “Il est cependant certain que ni le 
mouvement ou l’action, ni la résistance ou la force passive ne dérivent de l’étendue, comme je 
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l’ai montré ailleurs. En effet, la notion d’étendue n’est pas primitive, mais peut être 
décomposée.” (Leibniz, 1996: 33) 
4 I am grateful to Dante Diotallevi (Queen's University, Canada) for his critical reading and 
suggestions, to Thomas Steinbuch (Hangzhou University, China) for his comments, and I would 
also like to acknowledge the two anonymous reviewers for their precious help. 
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